ABSTRACT. In recent years, quite some progress has been made in understanding the security of encryption schemes in the presence of key-dependent plaintexts. Here, we motivate and explore the security of a setting, where an adversary against a signature scheme can access signatures on key-dependent messages.
Introduction
Established security notions for encryption schemes like IND-CCA refer to scenarios where encrypted plaintexts do not depend on the secret key. For some scenarios-like encrypting a hard disk storing the secret decryption key-such a security model is inadequate. Here the question of secure encryption in the presence of key-dependent messages naturally arises, and in recent years, significant progress in understanding such scenarios has been made (see [BRS03] , [BPS07] , [HK07] , [BHHO08] , [HH08] , [HU08] , [ACPS09] for instance).
For signature schemes, scenarios with key-dependent messages seem much less understood. Although perhaps being less obvious than for key-dependent encryption, a scenario where an adversary may have access to signatures on key-dependent messages is not that far-fetched: if we grant an adversary access to the signature of a (possibly encrypted) backup of a hard disk containing the secret signing key, then this is a scenario not covered by EUF-CMA security. A natural question arises about how to combine the security definitions of 2010 M a t h e m a t i c s S u b j e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n: 94A60. K e y w o r d s: signature scheme, key-dependent message, forward security.
key-dependent encryption and signing to come up with a signcryption scheme that is secure in the presence of key-dependent messages, and this is explored in [Gon09] . Key-dependent signing seems also interesting in connection with combined public key schemes as discussed by H a b e r and P i n k a s [HP01] or G o n zá l e z V a s c o et al. [VHS09] : here keys used for decrypting and for signing are not necessarily independent, and signing a message derived from output of the decryption algorithm may actually imply signing a key-dependent message.
Our contributionº Following the notion of key dependent message (KDM) security proposed by B l a c k et al. [BRS03] , we propose a formalization of security in the presence of key dependent signatures (KDS). As discussed in Section 3.1, for stateless signers, a natural definition-where an adversay can obtain signatures on chosen key-dependent messages-allows no secure realization, even in the random oracle model. A compiler is presented which transforms any EUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme into a (necessarily stateful) KDS-CMA secure signature scheme, offering also forward security. In Section 4 we show that KDS-security and forward security are related, but independent security goals.
Further related workº In addition to research on forward secure signature schemes and on encryption in the presence of key-dependent messages, also, research on leakage resilient cryptography can be mentioned here. Specifically, K a t z [Kat09] explores signature schemes with bounded leakage resilience, where an adversary has limited access to information on the secret signing key. In a sense, the focus of [Kat09] is dual to ours: The work in [Kat09] focuses on a stateless signing algorithm, i.e., the secret key is not updated. To cope with such a scenario, a bound on the total leakage is imposed. In the discussion below, the adversary could in principle expose the complete secret key bit by bit, and we need a stateful signing algorithm to prevent such attacks. In terms of modeling adversarial capabilities, we decided to allow key-dependent queries to a signing oracle, rather than a sequence of leakage functions. As here we do not aim at modeling attacks at the implementation level, like side-channel attacks, this seems a viable model.
In F a u s t et al.'s independent work [FKPR09] on Leakage-Resilient Signatures, side-channel attacks are a central motivation. F a u s t et al. focus on a scenario with bounded leakage per invocation, respectively, leakage functions with bounded range. Like in the next section, stateful signature schemes are considered, and the resulting security notion is called UF-CMLA. F a u s t et al. present a compiler that lifts a 3-time signature scheme to an UF-CMLA secure signature scheme that can sign a prespecified number of messages.
SECURITY OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES...
Preliminaries and definitions
As already indicated and as will be detailed below, for our purposes it is crucial to allow a stateful signing algorithm, and the subsequent definitions take this into account.
Signature schemes and existential unforgeability
We formalize a signature scheme similarly as in [GMR88] . Technically, the main difference from [GMR88] is that we consider the secret key as part of the signer's state, instead of allowing auxiliary input to the signing algorithm. Moreover, we also allow the signing algorithm to output an error symbol.
Ò Ø ÓÒ 1 (Signature scheme)º A signature scheme S is a triple of polynomial time algorithms S = (K, S, V): − K is a probabilistic key generation algorithm which on input the security parameter 1 k returns a pair (sk, pk) of keys-a public verification key pk with matching secret signing key sk ∈ {0, 1} * . In case of a stateful signer, we interpret sk as initial state of the signer, i. e., all secret information of the signer is part of its state.
− S is a probabilistic signing algorithm which on input a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and state sk-which in case of a stateless signer is just the secret key--returns a signature σ ∈ {0, 1} * on M or an error symbol ⊥. Moreover, the state value sk is updated.
− V is a deterministic verification algorithm which on input a public key pk, a message M, and a candidate signature σ for M returns true or false, indicating whether σ is a valid signature for M under the public key pk.
For pairs (sk, pk) output by K we require that with overwhelming probability the obvious correctness condition holds: for all messages M we have
The standard security requirement for signature schemes is EUF-CMA which stands for existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack (cf. [GMR88] ): Ò Ø ÓÒ 2 (EUF-CMA)º Let S = (K, S, V) be a signature scheme, and let A euf be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Consider the following attack scenario:
1. Compute a key pair (sk, pk) In particular, security in the sense of EUF-CMA does not allow an adversary to obtain signatures on key-dependent messages-like a signature on the complete secret key (state) sk. In fact, given an EUF-CMA secure signature scheme, it is easy to come up with a signature scheme that is still EUF-CMA secure, but where a single key-dependent message query breaks the security of the scheme.
Security in the presence of key-dependent signatures
Informally, a signature scheme S = (K, S, V) is referred to as KDS-CMA secure if it is secure despite a forger's ability to obtain signatures on arbitrary (efficiently computable) functions g of the signer's state sk. In particular, g has access to the secret key stored at the time of signing. 2. The adversary A kds is given unrestricted access to a signing oracle O S . The oracle O S accepts as input a function g, represented as a boolean circuit of polynomial size, and executes the signing algorithm S with the current state sk and the message g(sk) as input. 
Eventually, A
kds outputs a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and a signature σ.
Let QueriedEarlier be the event that A kds outputs a message M such that one of A kds 's queries g to the signing oracle O S evaluated to g(sk) = M . Then the success probability Succ A kds = Succ A kds (k) of A kds is defined as Succ A kds := Pr V pk (M, σ) = true and ¬ QueriedEarlier , and we call the signature scheme S secure in the sense of KDS-CMA if Succ A kds is negligible for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A kds .
Achieving KDS-CMA security
By definition, security in the sense of KDS-CMA implies security in the sense of EUF-CMA, and the question arises whether/how security in the sense of Definition 3 can be achieved.
Impossibility of KDS-CMA with a stateless signing algorithm
As a first (negative) result, we note that no signature scheme with a stateless signing algorithm can meet the security goal of KDS-CMA security.
Remark 2º Let S = (K, S, V) be a signature scheme with a stateless signing algorithm S, i. e., the secret signing key sk is not changed by executing S. Then the signature scheme S is not secure in the sense of KDS-CMA.
ℓ be the bit representation of the secret key and fix i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ − 1} arbitrary. Then the adversary A may query O S for a signature on b i and use the public verification algorithm V to determine if the returned signature σ satisfies V pk (0, σ) = true or V pk (1, σ) = true. Thus ℓ queries to O S are sufficient to extract the complete secret signing key sk, and hereafter creating a forgery is trivial.
Despite its simplicity, the attack in the proof of Remark 2 is quite devastating, and it might not be obvious if KDS-CMA security can be achieved at all. In the next section we show that, in the random oracle model, allowing the signing algorithm to be stateful enables the derivation of a KDS-CMA secure signature scheme from any one-time EUF-CMA secure one.
From one-time EUF-CMA to KDS-CMA: a compiler
The compiler in Figure 1 uses a random oracle H : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} k to transform any one-time EUF-CMA secure signature scheme into one that is KDS-CMA secure (in the random oracle model). While we do not expect this construction to be optimal from an efficiency point of view, it provides a tool to systematically construct KDS-CMA secure signature schemes.
ÈÖÓÔÓ× Ø ÓÒ 1º Let S = (K, S, V) be a one-time signature scheme that is secure in the sense of EUF-CMA. Then the signature scheme S = ( K, S, V) obtained from the compiler in Figure 1 is secure in the sense of KDS-CMA in the random oracle model. P r o o f. Let A kdm be an adversary in the sense of KDS-CMA, having a non--negligible success probability in creating a forgery for the signature scheme S. Then we can construct an adversary A euf that violates EUF-CMA security of the underlying one-time signature scheme S. For doing so, we start with A euf running a simulation of A S: To sign the ith (1 ≤ i) message M ∈ {0, 1} * proceed as follows:
− Create two fresh key pairs (sk
).
− Update the internal state sk = sk simulation strategy through a short sequence of games, the last one yielding an attack on the EUF-CMA security of the underlying one-time signature scheme S.
Game 0º This is a trivial simulation of the original attack game played by A kds : The public verification key and initial secret state of the challenge for A kds are fixed by A euf by running the key generation algorithm K. From here on, all needed oracles for A kds can be simulated faithfully: Signing oracle: Knowing the initial secret key, A euf can faithfully answer queries to O S by simply executing S with the appropriate input and using the above simulation of the random oracle H. 
Game 1º
can be predicted (in the sense specified in Remark 3) by A kds , we modify A kds to make such a prediction, therewith replacing the potentially key--dependent query g i * with a key-independent query g i * . By construction, the success probability of A kds remains non-negligible, provided it was non-negligible before.
Remark 3º Let σ be a signature on the value output above in (1). We say that A kds can predict the value (1) if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time (extractor) algorithm E which on input the state of A kds and g i * outputs a message M such that M equals the value in (1) with non-negligible probability.
− If the value (1) can be predicted with negligible probability only, A euf creates a key pair (sk euf can faithfully answer all key-dependent queries since it has generated the keys during the simulation. Where this is not the case, the adversary A kds may have to predict a polynomial number of values, which in turn may make its success probability negligible, depending on the correctness of the predictions. − We have V pk * r H(M r), s = true and r H(M r) has not been submitted to A euf 's signing oracle. Consequently, A euf has created a valid forgery.
Summarizing, we see that if A
kds 's forgery is valid with non-negligible probability, the same holds for A euf 's forgery.
KDS-CMA and forward security
In forward security, so-called key-evolving signature schemes are considered, and compromise of the current secret key does not enable an adversary to forge signatures pertaining to the past. Signatures for messages signed in the past under a fixed public key are valid even if the current secret key is exposed. Furthermore, the adversary cannot forge signatures with a "date" prior to key exposure. In this section we discuss connections between KDS-CMA and forward security-to the latter, we will refer to as FWD-CMA.
Key-evolving signature schemes and forward security
We adopt some terminology from B e l l a r e and M i n e r [BM99a] , [BM99b] , starting by defining a key-evolving signature scheme.
Ò Ø ÓÒ 4 (Key-evolving signature scheme)º A key-evolving signature scheme S f is a quadruple of polynomial time algorithms
1. K f is a probabilistic key generation algorithm which on input the security parameter 1 k , the total number of time periods T ∈ N (and possibly other parameters) returns a pair (sk 0 , pk) of keys-a public verification key pk with matching (base) secret signing key sk 0 .
U
f is a deterministic secret key update algorithm which takes as input the secret signing key sk j−1 of the previous time period j − 1 and returns the secret signing key sk j for time period j.
S
f is a probabilistic signing algorithm that on input a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and the secret signing key sk j of the current time period j returns a signature j, ζ
for M for time period j ∈ N or returns an error symbol ⊥.
V
f is a deterministic verification algorithm which on input a public key pk, a message M, and a signature j, ζ returns true or false, indicating whether the signature is accepted or rejected, respectively.
We may assume that sk j stores the value j itself for period j ∈ {1, . . . , T } as well as the total number T of time periods. Further on, we adopt the convention that sk T +1 is the empty string and that U f (sk T ) returns sk T +1 . Both the current time period j and the total number of time periods T are publicly known and accessible to an adversary A fwd along with the attacked public key pk. The actual attack game used to define forward security of a key-evolving signature scheme involves three stages: the chosen message attack phase (cma), the break-in phase (breakin), and the forgery phase (forge).
be a key-evolving signature scheme, and let A fwd be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Consider the following attack scenario:
1. CMA phase Set j ← 0, and generate a key pair (sk 0 , pk)
The adversary A fwd is handed the current secret key sk j .
Forge phase
Eventually, A fwd outputs a message M and a signature b, ζ with b < j.
Let QueriedEarlier be the event that A fwd outputs a message M that has already been queried to a signing oracle O j S f . The success probability
pk M, b, ζ = true and ¬ QueriedEarlier , and we call the signature scheme S f forward-secure if Succ A fwd is negligible (in k) for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A fwd .
The process in Definition 5 is strictly ordered in that once an adversary gives up the signing oracle for sk j , it cannot obtain access to that oracle again. At some point, the adversary A fwd decides to use its break-in privilege and is returned the current secret key sk j . To be successful, A fwd must forge a signature under sk b for some b < j and new message M.
Remark 4º
By definition, a FWD-CMA secure scheme allows an adversary A fwd to submit a polynomial number of queries to its signing oracle within a single time period j. Thus, in the presence of key-dependent messages, an attack as presented in the proof of Remark 2 may reveal the complete secret key, before an update of the secret key occurs. In other words, security in the sense of FWD-CMA does not imply strong security guarantees in the presence of key--dependent messages.
Contrasting the above negative statement, after applying some technical modifications to obtain a syntactically correct key-evolving signature scheme, the compiler in Figure 1 (which was designed to achieve KDS-CMA security) can be used to lift an EUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme S to a forward secure key-evolving signature scheme S − Create two fresh key pairs (sk
), where j is the current time period. − Update the internal state sk = j, sk ÈÖÓÔÓ× Ø ÓÒ 2º Let S = (K, S, V) be a one-time signature scheme that is secure in the sense of EUF-CMA. Then the key-evolving signature scheme Figure 2 is secure in the sense of FWD-CMA in the random oracle model. P r o o f. Let A fwd be an adversary in the sense of FWD-CMA, having a non--negligible success probability in creating a forgery for the signature scheme S f given in Figure 2 . Then we can construct an adversary A euf that violates EUF-CMA security of the underlying one-time signature scheme S.
can be summarized as in Figure 3 . We note that this scheme is not secure in the sense of FWD-CMA, however: − Create a fresh key pair (sk i , pk i ) The adversary A fwd succeeds because the signatures requested can be used later on as certificates in the forgery. Therefore, we can avoid this attack if we append a 1 in front of any public key pk i to be used in a certificate, as well as append a 0 in front of any message M to be signed. More specifically, in Figure 3 
Conclusion
Given an existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme, the construction we presented yields a signature scheme offering strong guarantees in the presence of key-dependent messages. Especially, if we are willing to make stronger assumptions than the availability of a one-time signature, the efficiency of our compiler is not completely satisfying, and exploring alternative constructions seems worthwhile. For instance, techniques as used for aggregate signatures might be attractive to reduce the size of signatures. Also, the feasibility of treebased constructions (as in [BM99b] , [FKPR09]) lends itself as a natural topic for further research. Finally, from a practical point of view, it appears desirable to explore in more detail which guarantees can be achieved with a "stateless" signing algorithm, i.e., if the signer's secret key cannot be updated.
